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HE only cases decided during the Survey period that dealt with anti-
trust issues considered the substantive law in effect prior to the enact-
ment of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983
(TFEAA).1 In Cooper v. Fortney2 the court held that a contract that obli-
gated a seller to deliver a fixed quantity of lignite over a sixty-month period
was not an output contract. 3 Consequently, the provisions of the agreement
prohibiting the seller from delivering lignite to any competitor of the pur-
chaser unduly restrained competition in violation of the antitrust laws in
effect when the parties drafted the contract. 4
Due to the unusual manner in which the plaintiff raised the antitrust issue
in Cooper, the court was not required to address the issue of whether the
remedies of the TFEAA should apply to violations that occurred prior to its
enactment. 5 This issue of retroactive application of TFEAA remedies arose
in Savin Corp. v. Copy Distributing Co.6 In Savin a manufacturer of copy
equipment brought a collection suit against a distributor. The distributor
defended on the grounds that the terms of the contract prohibiting the dis-
tributor from selling to anyone other than retail end users violated the anti-
trust laws in effect in 1979, the time that the parties entered into the
contract. Although the parties apparently agreed that the provision in ques-
tion violated the antitrust laws previously in effect, 7 they debated the appro-
priate remedy. The antitrust laws previously provided that an agreement
* B.A., St. Edward's University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.26 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
2. 703 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
3. Id. at 219. The Texas Supreme Court has generally held output contracts, which
require a seller to deliver all of the products it is able to produce during a given period, not to
be in violation of the Texas antitrust laws. See Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Mktg. Co.,
150 Tex. 533, 540-41, 243 S.W.2d 823, 827-28 (1951).
4. 703 S.W.2d at 222.
5. The plaintiff in Cooper brought a legal malpractice action, seeking damages occa-
sioned by the fact that the federal district court ruled the contract in question to be unenforce-
able. As a result, the court did not apply the antitrust remedies in the Cooper case. Id. at 222-
23.
6. 716 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
7. Id. at 691. The court's holding is consistent with the court's opinion in Llewellyn v.
Borin, 569 S.W.2d 946, 949-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
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that contained any term that violated those laws was unenforceable.8 Conse-
quently, this remedy would have prohibited the manufacturer in Savin from
collecting any sums due and owing under the agreement. 9 The TFEAA does
not include this draconian remedy. Section 311.031(b) of the Code Con-
struction Act provides that in cases in which a reenactment or amendment
of a statute has reduced a penalty, the reduced penalty shall apply.10 Based
on this statute, the manufacturer argued that courts should not enforce the
forfeiture provision. The court rejected this contention on grounds that are
unclear. 11
The court noted that the TFEAA continues to provide that every contract
in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful. 12 The court then stated,
"Whether the contract is an unlawful restraint of trade is a matter of sub-
stantive law. The general rule is that the laws which are in existence at the
time of the making of the contract are impliedly incorporated into the con-
tract." 13 This reasoning seems to confirm that the legality of the provisions
in the contract should be judged under the law in effect at the time the par-
ties entered into the contract, but fails to address the issue of the appropriate
remedy. Future cases hopefully will clarify the issue of whether Texas
courts should refuse to enforce contracts that predate the enactment of the
TFEAA and contain provisions that violate the preexisting antitrust laws.
II. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
A. Definition of Consumer
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA) 14 provides relief for a consumer defined, with certain exceptions, as
an individual, partnership, corporation, the State of Texas, or a subdivision
or agency of the State of Texas who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease,
any goods or services. 15 The DTPA specifically applies to consumer
purchases of goods defined as "tangible chattels or real property purchased
or leased for use." 16 Texas courts have consistently held that a security is
not a good within the meaning of the DTPA 17 and thus have prevented
claims for securities fraud from being brought as DTPA actions. The plain-
tiff in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood '8 successfully overcame this hurdle
8. Act of Sept. 1, 1967, ch. 785, § 15.04, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343, 2556, amended by
Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 519, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3010, 3014.
9. See W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Gober, 3 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App-Waco 1928, no
writ).
10. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.031(b) (Vernon Special Pam. 1987).
11. Savin, 716 S.W.2d at 692.
12. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
13. 716 S.W.2d at 692.
14. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
15. Id. § 17.45(4).
16. Id. § 17.45(1).
17. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Tex. 1980); Portland Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Shulman Gov't Sec., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
18. 708 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ granted).
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by alleging that his purchase of securities included the purchase of a service
in the form of brokerage advice. Acting on advice from the defendant bro-
ker that the transaction would be tax free, the plaintiff withdrew all of the
funds from his retirement account and invested in other securities in order to
obtain a higher return. After the Internal Revenue Service treated the trans-
action as a taxable event, the plaintiff initiated a DTPA action against the
broker, claiming that he had purchased investment advice as the result of
misrepresentations made to him. The broker first maintained that he gave
the investment advice without consideration, and that the plaintiff thus
neither purchased nor leased the advice within the meaning of the DTPA. 19
The court noted that as a full service brokerage house the defendant received
higher commissions than would a discount brokerage house because of the
services rendered to its customers. 20 As a result, the court concluded that
the services of tax investment counseling and assisting in the purchase of
securities were inextricably intertwined. The court could then characterize
the plaintiff as a consumer of a service within the meaning of the DTPA.2 1
Consequently, the court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.22
Although the definition of goods under the DTPA does not cover securi-
ties in the form of stocks and bonds, some overlap between the definition of
securities under the federal and state securities laws and the definition of
goods under the DTPA does exist. In MBank Fort Worth, N.A. v. Trans
Meridian, Inc. 23 the court held that a purchase of a working interest in an oil
and gas lease constituted a purchase of goods within the meaning of the
DTPA.24 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
purchase of the working interest was a securities transaction for purposes of
both the federal and state securities laws.25
Courts have consistently held that an attempt to acquire money is not an
attempt to purchase goods or services as defined in the DTPA. 26 In keeping
19. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(I) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
20. 708 S.W.2d at 868.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 871. The court's ultimate conclusion does not appear well founded. The court
found that the statement regarding the tax benefits of the investment constituted a misrepre-
sentation of the benefits, characteristics, or qualities of the broker's service, which is a violation
of TEX. Bus. & COM. .ODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987). Youngblood, 708
S.W.2d at 869. The misrepresentation, however, did not concern the nature of the investment
advice. The opinion fails to reflect any statements made by the broker regarding the quality of
the advice that he would render. Instead, the statement in question concerned the benefits of
the security itself, i.e., whether one could purchase the security without adverse tax conse-
quences. Since the applicable provision of the DTPA only prohibits misrepresentations re-
garding the benefits or characteristics of goods or services, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987), and since the security in question does not fall within the
definition of either of these terms, this section does not make the statements actionable under
the DTPA.
23. 625 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
24. Id. at 1279.
25. Id. at 1277 n.7.
26. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Tex. 1980); Portland Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Gov't Sec., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
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with this principle, the court in Grass v. Credito Mexicano, SA.27 held that
the purchase of a certificate of deposit is not a purchase of goods or services
within the meaning of the DTPA.28 The court in First Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Ritenour29 reached a contrary conclusion on the ground
that the plaintiff in that case had also purchased a service in the form of
advice and counseling. Specifically, an employee of the defendant bank had
advised the plaintiff that the bank could place a hold on the certificate to
prevent his wife from withdrawing the funds even though the spouses jointly
owned the certificate. The plaintiff recovered judgment against the bank af-
ter his wife withdrew the funds.30
The court in Hennessey v. Skinner3' considered the question of whether
the transaction at issue included the purchase of a partnership interest,
which the DTPA would not cover, or the purchase of an interest in cattle,
which the DTPA would cover. The plaintiff paid $2000 for a ten percent
interest in the defendant's herd of sixty-three cows. He paid an additional
$120 for a ten percent interest in a specified bull. The parties entered into a
partnership for the raising and selling of cattle. The court held that the
plaintiff did not purchase an intangible partnership interest, but instead
purchased an undivided interest in the cows in question, after which the
parties became partners.3 2 The court further noted that even if the plaintiff
had purchased a combination of tangible goods and an intangible partner-
ship interest, the legislature clearly intended that the DTPA cover such
mixed purchases. 33
B. Notice
At least thirty days before filing suit under the DTPA a consumer must
give the potential defendant written notice of his specific complaint and the
amount of actual damages and expenses, including attorney's fees, that the
consumer incurred in asserting the claim. 34 The court in Village Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Porter35 held that a claimant does not have to disclose the
specific theory of the claim, nor does a claimant have to advise a potential
defendant of the particular sections of the DTPA that the defendant has
violated.36 Three cases decided during the Survey period confirmed that the
defendant must raise a plaintiff's failure to give the required notice. In West
27. 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1575, 94 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1987).
28. Id. at 222.
29. 704 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Id. at 900-01. The dissent argued that the plaintiff was not a consumer because he and
his wife purchased the certificate of deposit some eight months before the bank employee gave
the advice. Consequently, at the time the bank issued the certificate of deposit, all the plaintiff
acquired was the certificate itself, which is not a "good." Furthermore, at the time the em-
ployee gave the advice, no funds changed hands, and thus the plaintiff did not acquire this
"service" by purchase or lease. Id. at 902 (Seerden, J., dissenting).
31. 698 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
32. Id. at 385.
33. Id.
34. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
35. 716 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
36. Id. at 547.
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v. Carter,37 Brown Foundation Repair & Consulting v. McGuire, 3 and Metro
Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis 39 the courts held that the defendant bore the
burden of raising noncompliance with the notice statute through special ex-
ception, plea in abatement, objection to testimony, or some equivalent means
of calling the matter to the court's attention.4g
C. Producing Cause
Although the Texas Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff need not show
reliance upon a misrepresentation in order to prevail in a DTPA claim, a
plaintiff still must show that the defendant's misrepresentation was a pro-
ducing cause of his loss.4 1 The plaintiff in MacDonald v. Texaco, Inc.42
failed to meet this burden. The plaintiff, Ronald MacDonald, brought suit
against Texaco after a fire at a Texaco station destroyed his van. The plain-
tiff claimed that Texaco represented to him that he could "Trust ... [His]
Car to the Man Who Wears the Star," that he had done so, and that Texaco
had rewarded his trust with a burned out shell. 43 The plaintiff admitted,
however, that he chose the particular station to which he took his van based
on the fact that a third party informed him that the station would have a
mechanic on duty. Since the Texaco slogan did not induce him to deliver his
car to the station in question, it was not a producing cause of his damages.44
D. Damages
A plaintiff who prevails in a DTPA action may recover the amount of
actual damages that the defendant's conduct has caused.45 Since the DTPA
does not delineate the types of injuries that are compensable under the Act, a
court must look to the common law for guidance as to the damages that are
recoverable.4 6 The plaintiff in Farrell v. Hunt47 suffered an adverse judg-
ment as a consequence of his failure to prove actual damages in accordance
with common law principles. The plaintiff mortgagor brought suit against
the defendant mortgagee for wrongful foreclosure and for violation of the
DTPA. The jury found that at the time of foreclosure the plaintiff had not
defaulted on his note and that the defendant knowingly entered into an un-
37. 712 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. 711 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. 709 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. West, 712 S.W.2d at 574-75; McGuire, 711 S.W.2d at 353; Davis, 709 S.W.2d at 788.
41. Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985); see Hughes & Gavin, Commer-
cial Torts and Deceptive Trade Practices, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 133, 144
(1986) [hereinafter Hughes & Gavin, 1986 Annual Survey].
42. 713 S.W.2d 203 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
43. Id. at 204.
44. Id. at 205. The court did not address the question of whether an advertising slogan
can be an actionable misrepresentation under the DTPA. It is hoped that the court would
have found this statement to be akin to the puffery that occurs when a seller touts his wares,
which is not actionable. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
45. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
46. See Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
47. 714 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1986).
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conscionable course of action in foreclosing on the property. The proper
measure of damages in a wrongful foreclosure suit is the "difference between
the value of the property in question at the date of foreclosure and the re-
maining balance due on the indebtedness. ' 48 Although the plaintiff obtained
a finding on the market value of the property on the date of foreclosure, he
failed to offer proof or request an issue on the amount of the indebtedness
due at that time. This fatal shortcoming in his wrongful foreclosure action
also barred any claim under the DTPA, since it amounted to a failure to
prove actual damages recoverable under the Act. Consequently, the
supreme court affirmed the granting of a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. 49
The plaintiff in Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis 50 met with consider-
ably better luck in establishing damages under the DTPA. The plaintiff re-
covered actual damages in the amount of $534,016 and attorney's fees in the
amount of $20,000 based on his purchase of a diesel truck that had a
purchase price of $48,500. The truck was a genuine lemon requiring the
plaintiff to incur costs for repairs and lost running time, eventually leading
to the repossession of the truck. The court affirmed the recovery of damages
for loss of use of the truck from the date of repossession through the date of
trial, a period of approximately twenty-five months. 51 Based on testimony
regarding reasonable rental rates, the jury awarded $74,016 for lost use.
This award was more than the value of the truck itself. The jury also
awarded damages for the difference in value of the truck as sold and as rep-
resented, lost earnings, mental anguish, and additional damages for a know-
ing DTPA violation. Finally, the court awarded actual damages for loss of
credit, apparently the first such award under the DTPA.5 2
In a decision that has the potential to expand dramatically the definition
of actual damages, the court in Village Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Porter53 al-
lowed the plaintiff to recover compensation for the time spent in attempting
to solve problems that the defendant's deceptive acts had created.54 The
defendant in that case sold a mobile home that was subject to an undisclosed
lien. The court affirmed an award of damages for the time the plaintiff spent
in conducting a title search.55 This decision opens the door for plaintiffs to
seek recovery for personal time spent on the matter that is the subject of the
litigation. Although the damages in Porter were not substantial, a highly
paid professional, whose time could be worth upwards of $200 per hour,
could accrue substantial DTPA damages.56
48. League City State Bank v. Mares, 427 S.W.2d 336, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. 714 S.W.2d at 300.
50. 709 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, ref'd writ n.r.e.).
51. Id. at 790.
52. Id. at 791.
53. 716 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
54. Id. at 550.
55. Id.
56. The court's opinion does not give much guidance concerning the circumstances under
which a court may award damages to compensate a plaintiff for the loss of his time. Can a
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A plaintiff in a DTPA case has a duty to mitigate the damages that he
suffers. In Great State Petroleum, Inc. v. Arrow Rig Service, Inc.57 the court
held that a plaintiff is allowed to recover as damages the amount reasonably
expended in his efforts to mitigate his damages.58 The plaintiff in that case
purchased a new drilling rig in order to avoid losses of approximately $5000
for each day that a defective rig was not in operation. The court held that
upon retrial the jury must determine whether replacement or repair of the
rig was more reasonably necessary under the circumstances, but that the
plaintiff could recover the cost of whichever of these two courses the jury
found appropriate. 59
In addition to actual damages, the DTPA allows a plaintiff to recover
automatically two times that portion of the actual damages that does not
exceed $1000. 60 In Blue Island, Inc. v. Taylor 61 the court held that the trial
court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on this automatic award of
an additional $2000 in damages.62 A plaintiff who can establish that the
defendant acted knowingly can recover even greater rewards. If the trier of
fact finds a knowing violation of the DTPA, the court may award additional
damages of not more than three times the amount of actual damages in ex-
cess of $1000.63 The court in Melody Homes Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes 64
held that a jury may award additional damages upon finding that a defend-
ant has engaged in a knowing breach of warranty regardless of whether the
jury finds that the defendant engaged in any of the false, misleading, or de-
ceptive acts listed under the DTPA.65 In Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Reed 66
the court of appeals modified the trial court's judgment by awarding addi-
tional damages under the DTPA as well as exemplary damages, both of
which the jury found.67 Although the general rule is that recovery under the
DTPA is cumulative of other remedies, 68 the court of appeals' decision in
Reed is inconsistent with previous cases that denied the recovery of both
exemplary and additional damages under the DTPA.69 The supreme court
reversed the award of exemplary damages in Reed on the ground that the
senior partner in a law firm who has to return a defective five-dollar product recover $200 for
the hour spent tending to the matter? Future decisions should keep this Pandora's box closed.
57. 706 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth), reheard on other grounds, 714 S.W.2d 429
(1986).
58. Id. at 807.
59. Id. at 809.
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
61. 706 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. Id. at 670.
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
64. 708 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986), aff'd, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489, 492
(June 17, 1987).
65. Id. at 602.
66. 703 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985), modified, 711 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.
1986).
67. Id. at 708.
68. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
69. See, e.g., Charlie Thomas Courtesy Ford v. Avalos, 619 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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plaintiff had failed to prove a tortious injury.70 As a result, the court failed to
reach the issue regarding the award of both exemplary and additional dam-
ages under the DTPA.
E. Defenses
Texas courts have consistently held that a simple breach of contract can-
not constitute a deceptive trade practice under the DTPA.71 The courts
have applied this principle most frequently by denying a plaintiff standing to
pursue a DTPA action against an insurance company that failed to pay a
claim.72 The United States district court in Lexington Insurance Co. v. Ben-
nett Evans Grain Co.73 and in South Texas National Bank v. United States
Fire Insurance Co.74 relied upon this principle in granting summary judg-
ments denying the plaintiffs any recovery on their DTPA claims based upon
the defendants' failure to pay insurance claims. 75 The court in Helms v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.76 applied this principle outside the insur-
ance arena. Specifically, the court affirmed a dismissal of a DTPA claim in
which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to list properly the plain-
tiff's number in the yellow pages. The court viewed this allegation as no
more than a simple breach of contract, which cannot constitute a violation
of the DTPA.77 To like effect is the court's opinion in Atrium Boutique v.
Dallas Market Center Co.,7 8 in which the court held that the breach of an
oral contract to renew a lease could not be actionable as a deceptive trade
practice. 79 The court indicated that it might have reached a different result
had the evidence indicated that at the time the parties entered into the oral
contract the defendant never intended to perform.80
In its opinion in Presidio Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distributing
70. 711 S.W.2d at 617.
71. See Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex.
1983); Coleman v. Hughes Blanton, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, no writ); Hughes & Gavin, Commercial Torts and Deceptive Trade Practices, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 123, 136-37 (1985) [hereinafter Hughes & Gavin, 1985
Annual Survey].
72. See American Ins. Cos. v. Reed, 626 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1981, no
writ); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Legate, 578 S.W.2d 505, 506-07 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. 642 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
74. 640 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
75. Lexington Ins., 642 F. Supp. at 83; South Tex. Nat'l Bank, 640 F. Supp. at 280-81.
76. 794 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 190-91. The court distinguished several cases allowing recovery under the
DTPA for an improper placing of a yellow page advertisement. The court noted that in these
other cases something more was shown than just a failure to comply with the contractual
terms. Id. at 191. See Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enters., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 180, 182-83 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. McKin-
non, 688 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
78. 696 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. Id. at 200.
80. Id.; see also Group Hosp. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (suit involving contract interpretation is for mere breach of
contract, which is not violation of DTPA).
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Corp.81 the Fifth Circuit discussed a second defense that is available to de-
fendants in a DTPA action. The plaintiffs in that case were film exhibitors
who brought suit against a film distributor alleging misrepresentations con-
cerning the movie The Swarm. The plaintiffs paid $65,000 for the right to
show the film, which turned out to be a flop. The plaintiffs alleged that
statements made in promotional materials regarding the film were actionable
misrepresentations under the DTPA. The Fifth Circuit first noted that to be
actionable as a misrepresentation a statement must be one of fact, meaning
"one that (1) admits of being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits
of empirical verification." ' 82 The court then held that the statements cited by
the plaintiffs, including claims that the film would be the "blockbuster for
the summer of 1978"83 and "the most 'want-to-see' movie of the year," 84
were not actionable statements of fact, as they turned on vague, indefinable
terms. The court characterized these statements as predictions.8 5 In lan-
guage that would sharply limit potential claims under the DTPA, the Fifth
Circuit held that a prediction or statement about the future is essentially an
expression of opinion, which is not ordinarily actionable. 86 An exception to
this rule exists for statements of opinion made by a person who has special
knowledge regarding the matter on which the person expresses the opin-
ion. 87 The court noted that this exception applies typically to the opinions
of specialized experts, such as jewelers, lawyers, and physicians, who base
their opinion on objective, verifiable facts.88 The exception is not applicable
in cases in which a plaintiff accuses a salesman of puffery in the sale of his
wares. Since the court believed that the facts before it constituted mere puf-
fing, the court reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and directed the
district court to dismiss the complaint. 89
The DTPA, in section 17.56A, contains a limitations provision requiring
that plaintiffs bring all actions within two years after the date on which the
conduct occurred or after which the consumer should have discovered the
occurrence of the act.90 The court's opinion in MBank Fort Worth, N.A. v.
Trans Meridian, Inc.91 expanded the defense provided in section 17.56A in
holding that the limitations provisions under the DTPA impliedly exclude
any savings provisions provided in other statutes.92 Specifically, the court
held that article 5539C,93 which allows a party to assert a time-barred coun-
81. 784 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 679.
83. Id. at 676.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 679.
86. Id. at 680.
87. Id. at 682. For a discussion of the "special knowledge" exception see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 539, 542 (1977).
88. 784 F.2d at 682.
89. Id. at 687.
90. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp. 1987).
91. 625 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
92. Id. at 1281-82.
93. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539c (Vernon 1969) (now codified at TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.069 (Vernon 1986)).
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terclaim that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim, did not apply to DTPA coun-
terclaims.94 In reasoning that is not altogether clear, the court held that the
only limitations provision applicable to a DTPA claim is provided in section
17.56A, and that if the legislature intended to give DTPA claimants the ben-
efit of savings provisions, it could have done so.95
In Jernigan v. Page,96 a decision discussed in a previous Survey article,97
the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that a plaintiff has constructive
notice of real property documents that are filed of record. 98 Such notice
estopped the plaintiff in Jernigan from claiming that the defendant had en-
gaged in an unconscionable act in foreclosing a recorded lien of which the
plaintiff had no actual knowledge. 99 The court in Medallion Homes, Inc. v.
Thermar Investments, Inc. 100 created a seemingly unwarranted extension of
this doctrine. The defendant in that case had contracted to convey to the
plaintiff property that the defendant intended to acquire from a third party.
The defendant could not acquire the property, however, and thus was unable
to convey in accordance with its agreement. The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant breached an implied warranty of title. The court held the claim
not tenable due to the fact that the real property records reflected the true
state of the ownership of the property. 10 The court concluded that "[tlhe
constructive notice provided by a recording statute is a defense to an action
under the DTPA."' 10 2
In Jenkins v. Steakley Bros. Chevrolet Co. 10 3 the court held that a defend-
ant could use the common law defense of accord and satisfaction to defeat a
plaintiff's DTPA claim. '04 The court in Bolton v. Alvarado 10 5 held that the
merger doctrine prohibited a plaintiff from relying upon the terms of a con-
tract for the sale of realty as the basis for his DTPA claim.' 0 6 Under the
terms of the contract in question the seller agreed to convey the property
free and clear of all encumbrances except those specified in the contract.
Although the exceptions in the contract did not include some outstanding
94. 625 F. Supp. at 1282.
95. Id. The court appears to have reached the wrong conclusion. Nothing contained
within the DTPA would preclude the application of general tolling and savings provisions that
the Texas Legislature enacts.
96. 662 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. See Hughes & Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 71, at 143.
98. 662 S.W.2d at 762.
99. Id.
100. 698 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
101. Id. at 402.
102. Id. It would seem that a purchaser should be able to rely upon representations of
ownership made by a seller without having to conduct a title search.
103. 712 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, no writ).
104. Id. at 590; see also Miranda v. Joe Myers Ford, Inc., 638 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd).
105. 714 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
106. Id. at 122-23. Under the merger doctrine, when the seller delivers, and the buyer
accepts the deed, the rights and duties created by a land sales contract merge into the deed
unless fraud, accident, or mutual mistake exists. As a result, a party is estopped to bring suit
on the contract once the seller delivers the deed. Commercial Bank, Uninc. v. Satterwhite, 413
S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. 1967).
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mineral interests, the delivered deed did exclude the interests. The court
held that since the plaintiff failed to obtain any findings of fraud or mutual
mistake that would warrant avoiding the application of the merger doctrine,
the plaintiff could not bring a DTPA claim based upon the defendant's fail-
ure to convey a deed that was consistent with the contract. 107
Two cases decided during the Survey period dealt with statutorily created
defenses. The court in Giles v. TI Employees Pension Plan 108 held that the
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974109 pre-
empted DTPA and common law claims for misrepresentation brought
against a pension plan. 110  The court in Holder v. Wood"II held that the
Manufactured Housing Standards Act (MHSA) 1 2 required a purchaser of a
mobile home to pursue administrative remedies for breach of an express war-
ranty prior to initiating a DTPA claim. 113 The MSHA, however, did not
preclude the plaintiffs from proceeding with their claims for breaches of im-
plied warranties and misrepresentations under the DTPA. 114
Three cases decided during the Survey period discussed the circumstances
under which a court would enforce a waiver or limitation of liability to de-
feat a DTPA claim. 1 15 In Singleton v. LaCoure1 16 the court held that lan-
guage sufficient to exclude an implied warranty under the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) 1 17 would also serve to defeat a claim for breach of
implied warranty under the DTPA.118 The court reasoned that the DTPA
itself does not create any warranties, but instead only provides relief for the
breach of independently established warranties. Since no warranty arose
under the UCC due to the effective waiver, the plaintiff could not point to
any warranty the defendant had breached.'1 9 The court in Metro Ford
Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis 120 held that although a party sometimes may
107. 714 S.W.2d at 123. The court noted that previous opinions, such as Smith v. Baldwin,
611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980), indicated that not all of the defenses that plagued common
law fraud and breach of warranty suits should apply in a DTPA action. 714 S.W.2d at 123.
The court held, however, that this principle would not preclude the application of the doctrine
of merger, which the court characterized as a rule of evidence rather than a defense. Id.
108. 715 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(b) (1982).
110. 715 S.W.2d at 59.
111. 714 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1986).
112. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 17(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
113. 714 S.W.2d at 319.
114. Id.
115. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1987). Section 17.42 pro-
vides that, with certain exceptions, any waiver by a consumer of the protections afforded in the
DTPA is unenforceable and void. Id. For a discussion of the conflict between this section and
common law principles of waiver see Hughes & Gavin, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 41 at
148-50.
116. 712 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1987).
118. 712 S.W.2d at 760.
119. Id. The court's opinion appears consistent with the reasoning of previous cases. See
McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., 685 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, no writ); Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Sys., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158, 160-61 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1983, no writ). For a discussion of McCrea see Hughes & Gavin, 1986 Annual
Survey, supra note 41, at 148-49.
120. 709 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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waive implied warranties under the UCC, the waiver would not preclude
that party from bringing a claim based upon misrepresentations made in
connection with the sale.121 Consequently, plaintiffs may avoid the effect of
limited warranties or other waivers that they execute by citing specific mis-
representations made in connection with the sale. Finally the court in Ep-
pier, Guerin & Turner v. Purolator Armored, Inc.122 held that a contractual
provision absolving Purolator from any liability for loss caused by nonper-
formance or delay of delivery prohibited the plaintiff from pursuing a DTPA
claim based on Purolator's failure to comply with its delivery schedule.
123
F Prospective Application of DTPA Amendments
The 1979 amendments to the DTPA provide: "This Act shall be applied
prospectively only. Nothing in this Act affects either procedurally or sub-
stantively a cause of action that arose in whole or in part prior to the effec-
tive date of this Act."' 24 The court in Cocke v. White 125 held that a claim
alleging a breach of an implied warranty in the sale of real property arose, at
least in part, at the time that the parties entered into the contract, in this
case, August 22, 1979.126 Since the contract predated the effective date of
the 1979 amendments, the court held that the plaintiff could automatically
recover treble damages for the breach. 127 The court reached this conclusion
even though the cause of action in Cocke did not accrue, for limitations pur-
poses, until the plaintiff discovered that the house was not built in a good
and workmanlike manner, which was after the effective date of the 1979
amendments.' 28 As a result, in cases that use a discovery rule for limitations
purposes, the ability to recover automatic treble damages continues.
The 1983 amendments contain language that is considerably less clear re-
garding the circumstances under which those amendments apply. Specifi-
cally, those amendments provide: "This Act applies only to the contract
executed on or after the effective date of this Act. A contract executed
before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect when the
contract was executed."' 29 Whether this language will apply in the same
fashion as the language in the 1979 amendments is unclear because many
121. Id. at 790.
122. 701 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
123. Id. at 296. The court noted, however, that the delivery in question had been merely
one in a series of deliveries made pursuant to the agreement in question. The court might have
reached a different result if the plaintiff in Purolator had entered into a special contractual
arrangement regarding the delivery in question by paying a higher rate for a timely delivery or
if Purolator had guaranteed to make this specific delivery in accordance with its schedule. Id.
at 297 n.l.
124. Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 603, § 9, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327, 1332. The effective
date of the Act was Aug. 27, 1979. Id.
125. 697 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Id. at 743-44.
127. Id. at 744. In 1979 the legislature amended the DTPA to allow an award of addi-
tional damages only if the trier of fact finds that the defendant knowingly committed the
DTPA violation. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
128. 697 S.W.2d at 745.
129. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 883, § 4, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4943, 4944.
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DTPA claims will not involve contracts. The San Antonio court of appeals
construed this language in a case involving a contract in Government Em-
ployees Credit Union v. Fuji Photo Film US.A., Inc.130 That court held that
the provisions of the 1983 amendments that exclude from the definition of
consumer a business consumer with assets of twenty-five million dollars1 31
and the provisions that allow waivers to be effective in the case of a business
consumer with assets of five million dollars or more1 32 both apply prospec-
tively only.1 33 Since the parties executed the contracts in question in 1981,
the court held that the plaintiff could pursue its DTPA claim despite the fact
that it would not qualify as a consumer under the 1983 amendments.
134
G. Counterclaim for Bad Faith and Harassing DTPA Actions
A number of cases decided during the Survey period considered the cir-
cumstances under which a defendant may recover attorney's fees incurred in
defending against a DTPA claim. Prior to the 1979 amendments the DTPA
provided: "On a finding by the court that an action under this section was
groundless and brought in bad faith, or for the purpose of harassment, the
court may award to the defendant reasonable attorneys' fees in relation to
the amount of work expended, and court costs."' 135 In a jury trial the initial
question is whether the trial court or the jury is to make the findings neces-
sary to support an award of attorney's fees under this provision. The court
in Fichtner v. Richardson 136 held that the established rule is that the trial
court must decide whether the suit is groundless and the jury must decide
whether the plaintiffs brought the suit in bad faith or for purposes of harrass-
ment.137 The court in Fichtner further noted that in ruling on the bad faith
and harassment issues the jury may properly consider evidence concerning
events that occurred between the time the plaintiffs filed suit and the time of
trial. 138
The court in Group Hospital Services, Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver
Center 139 established the standard against which a court may test a finding
of bad faith. The court stated that bad faith is present when a person acts
with "knowledge of such facts and circumstances to know that his or her
actions are wrong and, with such knowledge, acts with intentional disregard
of the rights of others." 14° In Heller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.141
130. 712 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
132. Id. § 17.42.
133. 712 S.W.2d at 211.
134. Id. at 214.
135. Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 143, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 327.
136. 708 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. Id. at 482; see Hughes & Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 71, at 147.
138. 708 S.W.2d at 482. Specifically, the court felt it proper for the jury to consider the
plaintiff's response to efforts that had been made by the defendant to appease the plaintiff after
the suit was filed. Id. at 483.
139. 704 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
140. Id. at 891 (quoting Glasgow v. Hall, 668 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
141. 708 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the court considered the type of evidence that would support a finding of bad
faith. The court held that the contradictions between the plaintiff's testi-
mony regarding the symptoms he allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to
a particular type of ceiling tile and the plaintiff's responses to a question-
naire filled out for a doctor, which indicated that he was not suffering any
such symptoms, were sufficient to support the jury's finding that the plaintiff
brought the claim in bad faith.' 42 The court in Xarin Real Estate, Inc. v.
Gamboa 143 also set forth standards to determine whether a claim is ground-
less within the meaning of the DTPA. The court held that a finding that no
arguable basis for the cause of action exists must occur before a court can
find a claim to be groundless. 144 Finally, the court in Wickersham Ford, Inc.
v. Orange County 145 held that under the 1979 amendments to the DTPA an
award of attorney's fees is mandatory upon a finding by the jury that the
plaintiff brought a DTPA claim for the purpose of harassment.
1 46
III. FRAUD
The typical fraud case involves a speaker who makes a false material rep-
resentation with knowledge that the statement is false when made or who
makes it recklessly with the intent that a third party will act upon it.147 A
promise to do an act in the future, however, may also constitute actionable
fraud if the speaker makes the promise with the intent to deceive the prom-
isee and with no intent to perform the promised act.1 48 This latter variety of
fraud was the subject of the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Spoliaric v.
Percival Tours, Inc. 149 The plaintiff employee in that case claimed that the
defendant employer had fraudulently induced him to continue his employ-
ment by promising a bonus the employer never intended to pay. The court
noted that failure to perform, standing alone, is no evidence to support a
claim that the promissor never intended to perform.' 5 0 Nevertheless, the
court held that only slight circumstantial evidence of intent not to perform,
when considered in conjunction with a breach of the promise to perform, is
sufficient to support a fraud claim.' 5 ' The court held that the evidence in
the record was sufficient to comply with this reduced standard. 152
142. Id. at 20.
143. 715 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
144. Id. at 86. Chief Justice Nye strongly disagreed with this conclusion, noting that under
the majority's standard a court would never grant an award for attorney's fees, as an arguable
basis for bringing a lawsuit always exists. Id. at 87 (Nye, C.J., dissenting).
145. 701 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
146. Id. at 350. In so holding, the court did not directly address whether, after the 1979
amendments, a court may properly submit the issues of bad faith and harassment to the jury or
whether the court must resolve these issues. This issue remains open. See Schott v. Leissner,
659 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 668 S.W.2d
686, 686-87 (Tex. 1984).
147. See Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977).
148. Stanfield v. O'Boyle, 462 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1971).
149. 708 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1986).





The court's opinion in Spoljaric also considered the circumstances under
which a plaintiff in a fraud case may recover punitive damages. The court
found that the proof that supported the jury's finding that the defendant
employer had intended to induce action on the part of the employee, which
was one of the elements of the fraud claim, constituted proof of conscious
indifference. This sufficiently supported an award of punitive damages.1 53
Consequently, in any case in which a plaintiff establishes the elements of
fraud in the form of an intentionally made false statement or promise, the
plaintiff may recover exemplary damages. The court will not require a find-
ing of malice.
Consistent with the supreme court's opinion in Spoljaric, the court in First
City Bank v. Global Auctioneers, Inc. 154 held that if the plaintiff establishes
that the defendant made a false representation with the intent of inducing
the plaintiff to act, the plaintiff may recover exemplary damages.155 Exem-
plary damages are not available, however, in the case of a defendant who
recklessly makes a statement without any knowledge of whether the state-
ment is true or not. Although reckless misrepresentations may give rise to a
claim for actual damages, the court in Group Hospital Services, Inc. v.
Daniel156 reversed the jury's award of exemplary damages because of the
plaintiff's failure to obtain a jury finding that the defendant knew that the
representation in question was false at the time that defendant made the
representation. 5 7
In New Process Steel Corp. v. Steel Corp. 58 the court considered the actual
damages that a party may recover in a successful fraud claim. The court
held that if the fraud results in the breach of a contract, a party may recover
damages in compensation for the loss of the benefit of the bargain and for
collateral losses caused by reliance upon the fraudulent representations. 59
The court in Abilene National Bank v. Fina Supply, Inc.160 held that a plain-
tiff in a fraud case must elect between damages or the equitable remedies of
reformation or rescission.' 6 1 Although a plaintiff may plead, present evi-
dence, and submit special issues on the theories of reformation, rescission,
and damages, the plaintiff must elect between legal or equitable relief at the
time the court enters judgment. 62 The Abilene National Bank court further
held that an alleged misrepresentation regarding the legal effect or interpre-
tation of a document is not actionable unless the person making the misrep-
resentation possesses superior knowledge regarding the law or is in a
153. Id. at 436.
154. 708 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. Id. at 17.
156. 704 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
157. Id. at 875.
158. 703 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. Id. at 215. The court's opinion apparently is limited to cases in which a plaintiff
prevails in both a breach of contract claim and in a fraud claim. In a strictly fraud case a
plaintiff can recover only reliance damages; benefit of the bargain damages are not recoverable.
Sobel v. Jenkins, 477 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex. 1972).
160. 706 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986), aff'd, 726 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1987).




confidential or fiduciary relationship with the recipient of the information. 163
The plaintiff in that case claimed that a representative of the defendant bank
made misrepresentations regarding the effect of an extension of a letter of
credit that secured a debt owing to the plaintiff. The court held that since
the evidence failed to establish that the bank representative had any special
knowledge in letter of credit transactions, any misrepresentations made by
her regarding the effect of the extension were not actionable.' 64
The defendant in West v. Carter165 thought that the jury's findings that
the plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known, that the statements made to him were false precluded the plaintiff
from prevailing on his fraud claim. The court held that no evidence existed
to support a finding that the plaintiff knew that the representations were
false; the jury, therefore, could have found only that the plaintiff should have
discovered that they were false.166 The court held that this finding did not
present any defense to a fraud claim. 167
Parties frequently allege fraud as a means of avoiding the terms of a con-
tractual agreement. Under the parol evidence rule, however, a party cannot
introduce evidence of a defendant's mere misrepresentation that he will not
enforce a negotiable instrument in accordance with its terms. 168 In order to
avoid the obligations of a negotiable instrument, the plaintiff must also show
that the defendant employed some sort of trick, artifice, or device.' 69 The
court in Friday v. Grant Plaza Huntsville Associates 170 relied on this basis to
affirm a summary judgment imposing liability upon a guarantor of a shop-
ping center lease. The guarantor's affidavit filed in response to the summary
judgment motion showed no more than that the plaintiff stated that he
would not enforce the guarantee and that he intended to use the guarantee
solely to assist the shopping center in obtaining permanent financing. The
absence of any further evidence of deceit or artifice was fatal to the fraud
defense. 171
The court in Coronado Transmission Co. v. O'Shea 172 held that a plaintiff
who seeks to avoid the terms of a contract that is not a promissory note or a
guarantee need not show any trick or artifice in addition to the standard
elements of fraud. 173 The court affirmed an award of actual and exemplary
damages for fraud in a case in which the defendant allegedly misrepresented
the percentage of revenues due the plaintiff under a net revenue interest
agreement. ' 74 The defendant orally represented to the plaintiff that he
163. Id. at 744.
164. Id. at 745.
165. 712 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. Id. at 575.
167. Id.
168. See Town N. Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex. 1978).
169. Id.
170. 713 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
171. Id. at 756-57.
172. 703 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




would receive five percent of the net revenues derived from the sale of natu-
ral gas to a designated corporation. The written agreement provided that
the plaintiff would receive five percent of the net revenues that the defendant
derived from such sales. As it turned out, the seller of the gas was a partner-
ship in which the defendant owned a forty-five percent interest. Conse-
quently, under the contract the plaintiff received only five percent of the
defendant's forty-five percent share, whereas the defendant had represented
that the plaintiff would receive five percent of the total net sales. The court
held that these representations were actionable despite the terms of the parol
evidence rule.1 75
The court's opinion in Johnson v. Smith 176 has the potential to expand
broadly the cause of action for fraud. In Johnson the court held that the
plaintiff must establish the traditional elements of a fraud claim only in in-
stances where the alleged fraud is in the form of a specific misrepresenta-
tion.177 The plaintiff need not show these elements, however, if he alleges
fraud in the form of some cunning, deception, or artifice used to cheat or
defraud him. ' 78 The plaintiff in Johnson was the executor of the estate of a
party whom the defendant had allegedly defrauded in the sale of a home. In
payment of the purchase price of the house, the defendant had given a prom-
issory note that included a provision inserted by the defendant providing
that the note would terminate in the event of the payee's death. At the time
the payee signed the note, the payee was seventy-five years old, senile, ex-
tremely forgetful, and unable to understand his business affairs. The court
held that under the circumstances, a jury finding that the insertion of the
death clause was the result of fraud, which the instructions defined as the
successful employment of cunning, deception, or artifice to circumvent,
cheat, or defraud another, was sufficient to support an award of actual and
exemplary damages. ' 79
IV. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 80 recognizes a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation. This theory imposes liability upon a
party who, in the course of his business, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions. To succeed, a plaintiff
must show that he justifiably relied upon the supplied information and that
the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicat-
175. Id.
176. 697 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
177. Id. at 632.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 632-36. Although the court considered the defendant's conduct reprehensible,
the court's opinion in Johnson appears to be an unwarranted expansion of the fraud cause of
action. Furthermore, the opinion flies in the face of the well-established principle that the
terms of a document signed by a party bind that party and prohibit the party from claiming
that he did not read or understand the document's terms. See First City Mortgage Co. v.
Gillis, 694 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
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ing that information.181 During the Survey period the Dallas court of ap-
peals addressed this tort in two cases. In Cook Consultants, Inc. v. Larson 182
the court affirmed a judgment finding a surveyor liable for damages suffered
by the purchaser of a home that encroached upon an adjoining lot, an en-
croachment not shown on the survey.' 83 The survey contained a representa-
tion that it accurately represented the property and the location of the
buildings located thereon. Although the defendant prepared the survey for
the builder of the home, the court held that the purchaser could pursue the
negligent misrepresentation claim as a member of a class of persons whom
the surveyor foreseeably may have expected to rely upon the information.184
In a radical departure from the Restatement principles 185 the court allowed
the plaintiff to recover even though she had not relied upon the survey in
purchasing the home. 18 6 The plaintiff had not even seen the survey until
some nine years after her purchase. Nevertheless, the court held that the
plaintiff's loan would never have closed and thus she would not have consu-
mated her purchase but for the fact that the survey had misrepresented the
location of the house. 187 The court held that this evidence of causation suffi-
ciently satisfied the reliance requirement.' 88
The court also departed from the Restatement principles in its decision in
Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 189 In Blue Bell the court
reversed a summary judgment in favor of an accounting firm due to a finding
that factual issues existed as to the plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresen-
tation.' 90 The plaintiff alleged that it extended credit based on the financial
statements the defendant had prepared for the debtor. Although the Re-
statement limits the class of parties who may pursue a negligent misrepre-
sentation claim to persons whom the defendant actually and specifically
knows will receive the information, 191 the court held that the class of poten-
tial plaintiffs should be expanded to include all those parties of whom the
defendant should have known. 192 Since the plaintiff in Blue Bell had been a
trade creditor of the debtor at the time the defendant prepared the debtor's
financial statements, and since the debtor requested seventy copies of those
statements, the court held that the defendant should have known that the
plaintiff would receive the statements and act in reliance thereon. 193 Conse-
quently, the plaintiff could pursue its negligent misrepresentation claim de-
spite the fact that the defendant had no actual knowledge that the plaintiff
intended to extend additional credit in reliance upon the financial statements
181. Id.
182. 700 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
183. Id. at 239.
184. Id. at 234-36.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(b) (1977).
186. 700 S.W.2d at 236-37.
187. Id. at 237.
188. Id.
189. 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
190. Id. at 412-15.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment n (1977).
192. 715 S.W.2d at 412-13.
193. Id. at 413.
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the defendant had prepared. 194 The court noted that its decision cast doubt
upon the continuing validity of its decision in First Municipal Leasing Corp.
v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart,195 in which the court failed
to allow a plaintiff to pursue a negligent misrepresentation claim against an
attorney who issued an opinion letter to a client knowing that the plaintiff
third party would rely upon the letter.196
V. CONSPIRACY
The court in Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd.197 held an attorney
liable as a co-conspirator for advice given to a client. 198 The plaintiff in that
case purchased an apartment complex from joint owners. The title company
that closed the purchase became concerned about a gap in the chain of title
due to the fact that a deed of trust named an additional joint owner who had
not signed the deed to the plaintiff. To cure this problem the plaintiff and
joint owners agreed that the plaintiff would convey the property to the joint
owners, including the previously unnamed owner, and the joint owners
would immediately reconvey it to the plaintiff. Although plaintiff instructed
the title company not to record the deed from the plaintiff until after the
execution of the deed from the joint owners, the title company violated these
instructions at the request of one of the joint owners. Thus, the plaintiff no
longer held record title. In the course of attempting to resolve numerous
disputes that developed between the plaintiff and the previous owners, the
plaintiff's general partner discovered that no one had recorded the deed back
to the plaintiff. The general partner then scheduled a meeting with the joint
owner who refused to sign the deed and the joint owner's attorney. The joint
owner persisted in his refusal to sign the deed, at which point the plaintiff
asked whether an acceptable settlement figure existed. The defendant lawyer
responded with a request for $400,000. The court affirmed the judgment
against the attorney based on a jury finding of civil conspiracy. The court
noted that although an attorney generally owes no duty to an opposing
party, he is liable "if he knowingly enters into a conspiracy to defraud a
third person."' 99 The court extended this doctrine to include a conspiracy
194. Id. Although the court limited its holding to a finding that the plaintiff had standing
because it was a trade creditor known to the defendant at the time the defendant prepared the
financial statements, the court characterized as persuasive the reasoning of cases and commen-
tators who have urged adoption of a foreseeability test. Id. at 412. Under this test a court
could hold an accountant liable to all those whom he should reasonably expect to rely upon his
certification of financial statements. This would include all trade creditors, regardless of
whether they were known trade creditors at the time the accountant prepared the reports. See
Comment, The Citadel Falls?-Liability for Accountants in Negligence to Third Parties Absent
Privity: Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 348, 356-61
(1985). The court stated that allowing recovery by all foreseeable plaintiffs is consistent with
its opinion in Cook Consultants, Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 715 S.W.2d at 412 n.3.
195. 648 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. Blue Bell, 715 S.W.2d at 413, see First Mun. Leasing Corp., 648 S.W.2d at 413-14.
197. 696 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
198. Id. at 474
199. Id. at 472.
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to subject a third person to duress, which in that case took the form of eco-
nomic coercion. 200 The attorney and his client knew that the plaintiff would
suffer serious financial loss if it had to delay making repairs to the apartment
project. In fact, the attorney had advised the joint owner not to sign the
deed back to the plaintiff in order to obtain a bit of leverage that would help
settle a contractual dispute between the parties. The case failed to fit the
usual duress mold, however, in that the plaintiff had never actually paid the
money that the defendant demanded. The court noted that it was unaware
of any case in which a plaintiff had sued for damages proximately caused by
an unsuccessful attempt to exact money under duress.20 Nevertheless, the
court held that the attorney could be liable for a conspiracy to exert duress
regardless of whether the tort had actually been committed. 202
The court in Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Hurlbut203 reached a
conclusion directly contrary to that reached by the court in Likover. The
Hurlbut court reversed a judgment the lower court had rendered in favor of
the plaintiff on numerous theories, including civil conspiracy. 2°4 The court
first engaged in a lengthy consideration of whether it could sustain the judg-
ment on the jury's findings that the defendant committed various other
torts.20 5 After concluding that it could not sustain the judgment on this
basis, the court made short shrift of the conspiracy claim. The court noted
that the essence of civil conspiracy is the damage resulting from the commis-
sion of an independent tort and not the civil conspiracy itself.20 6 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that "if an act by one person cannot give rise to
a cause of action, then the same act cannot give rise to a cause of action if
done pursuant to an agreement between several persons. ' 20 7 The Hurlbut
court thus viewed a conspiracy claim merely as a means of extending liabil-
ity for the commission of a tort rather than as a tort in and of itself.208
Finally, the court's opinion in Futerfas v. Park Towers209 points out the
difficulty a defendant faces in seeking a summary judgment in a conspiracy
case. 210 The plaintiff in that case alleged that the defendants had furthered
their conspiracy through the use of unlawful acts in the form of harassing
telephone calls. The defendants filed affidavits denying that they conspired
200. Id. at 472-73.
201. Id. at 473.
202. Id. at 474. The court stated:
We are not here concerned with whether Likover and the Ritters actually
exerted duress on Sunflower Terrace, Ltd., or actually defrauded them. The
findings are that there was conspiracy to do these things and that the conspiracy
resulted in injury. The jury's affirmative findings on these issues are fully sup-
ported by the evidence.
Id.
203. 696 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ granted).
204. Id. at 102-03.
205. Id. at 90-101.
206. Id. at 102.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see Steinmetz & Assocs., Inc. v. Crow, 700 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
209. 707 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
210. Id. at 156.
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to injure the plaintiff or that they placed the telephone calls in question. The
court noted that statements denying involvement in a conspiracy are not
readily controvertible and thus do not satisfy the requirements for summary
judgment affidavits submitted by a party.211 The court's opinion renders it
virtually impossible for a defendant in a conspiracy case to obtain a sum-
mary judgment on the ground that he did not agree to engage in the conduct
in question with the intent to injure the plaintiff.
VI. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
For a plaintiff to have a valid cause of action for tortious interference with
a contract a defendant must interfere with the contract without legal justifi-
cation or excuse. Consistent with the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in
Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck 212 the court in Rural Development, Inc. v. Stone 213
held that in a tortious interference case the plaintiff has the burden of estab-
lishing that the defendant acted without legal justification or excuse.214
Since the record in that case contained no evidence on this issue, the court
reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and rendered judgment in favor
of the defendant. 215 The court considered the issue of what constitutes legal
justification or excuse for interfering with a contract in Top Value Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Carlson Marketing Group, Inc.216 In that case a trading stamp
company brought suit against a competitor who convinced eight large gro-
cery stores to break their contracts with the plaintiff and to begin carrying
trading stamps offered by the defendant. The defendant argued that business
competition allows a party the privilege to persuade customers to change
their business relations without incurring liability even if the party knows
that a broken contract will result. The court rejected this view, holding that
"the right of competition does not justify a person to knowingly and deliber-
ately, for his own benefit or advantage, induce the breach of a contract by
offering lower prices."' 2 17 The court also held that in a tortious interference
case it will award exemplary damages only upon an express finding of actual
malice in the form of "ill-will, spite, evil motive, or purposing the injuring of
another." 218
In Griffin v. Rowden 219 the court held that the filing of a lis pendens 220 is
an absolutely privileged act that cannot give rise to a claim for tortious inter-
211. Id. at 157-58; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
212. 669 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1984); see Hughes & Gavin, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 71,
at 128-30 (discussion critical of the Steck holding).
213. 700 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Id. at 666; see Steck, 669 S.W.2d at 107.
215. Stone, 700 S.W.2d at 666-68.
216. 703 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
217. Id. at 809-10. The court's opinion is consistent with the position taken in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 768(2) (1979). 703 S.W.2d at 809-10.
218. 703 S.W.2d at 813 (quoting Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1969)).
In Clements the court noted that the actual malice requirement would not apply upon a show-
ing of defendant's fraudulent conduct or other aggravating circumstances. 437 S.W.2d at 822.
219. 702 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
220. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007 (Vernon 1984).
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ference with contract. 221 The court did note that the basis of its decision
was its belief that good faith litigants should be assured access to the judicial
system.222 This reasoning would seem to imply that the filing of a lis
pendens as an incident to litigation that the plaintiff initiates in bad faith
should not enjoy the same protection. Due to the fact that the filing of a lis
pendens may cause a cloud on title and associated severe injuries, the courts
should allow a plaintiff to pursue a tortious interference claim if litigation
initiated in bad faith has clouded his title.
The Fifth Circuit considered the actual damages that a litigant may prop-
erly recover in a tortious interference case in its opinion in Marcus Stowell &
Beye Government Securities, Inc. v. Jefferson Investment Corp.2 2 3 The plain-
tiff in that case was a mortgage broker who had an exclusive brokerage
agreement with a savings and loan. During the period of the plaintiff's ex-
clusive agreement, the defendant, who had full knowledge of the plaintiff's
agreement, brought two potential mortgage purchasers to the savings and
loan's attention. The savings and loan eventually completed mortgage sale
transactions with both of those purchasers. As a result, the savings and loan
refused to consummate a sale to a party that the plaintiff had solicited. In
the plaintiff's suit against the competing broker for tortious interference, the
court considered the issue of whether the plaintiff should recover as damages
the commission that it would have received if it had consummated the sale
to its prospect or whether it should recover the amount of the commission
that the defendant had received, which was larger. Although courts outside
of Texas have awarded damages based on the defendant's profits, 224 the
court held that Texas courts would limit the plaintiff's recovery to his actual
loss. 225 This reasoning is consistent with the theory that the award of dam-
ages for tortious interference should be the same as the award of damages for
breach of contract, which is designed to place the injured party in the same
economic position it would have been in had the parties performed the con-
tract. In keeping with this theory, the court also held that the defendant in
Marcus was entitled to a credit in the amount that the plaintiff had received
in settlement of its breach of contract claim against the savings and loan. 226
VII. DEFAMATION AND INVASION OF PRIVACY
A statement that unambiguously and falsely imputes criminal conduct to
a party is slander per se, for which a court will presume damages.227 The
221. 702 S.W.2d at 694-95.
222. Id. at 695.
223. 797 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1986).
224. See Certified Laboratories v. Rubinson, 303 F. Supp. 1014, 1025-26 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(refusal to allow plaintiff to recover defendant's profit would allow the defendant to profit from
his wrongdoing); National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771, 774-75 (Mass.
1976) (recovery of lost profits may represent defendant's unjust enrichment).
225. 797 F.2d at 231.
226. Id. at 232-33. For the court to have held otherwise would have allowed the plaintiff a
double recovery. Id. at 233.
227. Glenn v. Gidel, 496 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ).
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court in Ramos v. Henry C. Beck CO. 2 2 8 expanded this doctrine to include
statements referring to a third party's report of criminal conduct on the part
of the plaintiff.229 The defendant in Ramos terminated the plaintiff's em-
ployment after receiving a telephone call from a third party who reported
that the plaintiff had stolen something out of a parking garage. In so doing
the defendant stated that a rumor existed that a third party had seen him
take a power tool from the parking garage. Although this statement did not
directly accuse the plaintiff of having stolen the tool, the court held that a
factual question existed as to whether the hearer of the statement could rea-
sonably understand that the statement imputed criminal conduct to the
plaintiff. Consequently, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of
the defendant.230 The Ramos court also noted that although a plaintiff may
not recover for a publication to which he has consented or which he has
invited, this doctrine did not preclude the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff had
merely asked why the defendant had terminated him. This would bar a def-
amation claim only if the plaintiff knew that the response of defendant's
employee would defame him.23 1
The San Antonio court of appeals considered a set of circumstances simi-
lar to those in Ramos in Chasewood Construction Co. v. Rico.2 32 The plain-
tiff subcontractor in that case claimed that the defendant defamed him at the
time the defendant fired him at the construction site. He testified that at the
time of his termination the general contractor's representative accused him
of having taken some $12,000 in materials, and gave him an ultimatum
either to return the materials or leave the job. The plaintiff left the job and
informed approximately 100 men who were working under him that the de-
fendant terminated him because of the accusation that he had been stealing.
This publication of the defamatory material by the plaintiff himself gave rise
to the plaintiff's damages. Nevertheless, the court held that since a reason-
ably prudent person under the circumstances would have known that the
plaintiff would have communicated these accusations to others, this republi-
cation was actionable.233 The dissent argued that the majority applied the
wrong standard. 234 Although one who utters a defamatory statement may
be liable for a republication if a reasonable person would have recognized
that there was an unreasonable risk that someone would republish the de-
famatory matter, this rule only applies in the case of republication by some-
one other than the defamed party.235 As noted in the discussion of the
228. 711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
229. Id. at 334-35.
230. Id. It would appear that the defendant could better have refuted the plaintiff's claim
by relying upon the truth of the statement. The court's opinion does not indicate any dispute
about the issue of whether the third party had in fact reported the theft. A statement recount-
ing the receipt of the third party's report would be true regardless of whether the theft actually
occurred.
231. Id. at 336.
232. 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
233. Id. at 445.




Ramos case,236 a plaintiff cannot recover for injuries sustained by reason of
publication of an alleged defamation if the plaintiff himself procured the
publication. 237 Consequently, the circumstances under which this type of
republication is actionable are much more limited than is true in the case of
a republication by a third party. The dissent argued that republication by
the plaintiff is actionable only if the republication was necessary, rather than
foreseeable. 238 Due to the absence of any jury finding on the question of
necessity, the dissent would have reversed the judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff and remanded the case for a retrial. 239
El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr24° contains a lengthy discussion of the differ-
ence between the publication of an opinion, which is not actionable, and a
statement of fact, which is actionable. 241 The plaintiff, an Assistant United
States Attorney claimed that an editorial appearing in the defendant's news-
paper defamed him. The statement at issue in effect stated that the burden
of proof faced by a prosecutor is no excuse for cheating. In determining
whether to view this statement as an opinion, the court noted several factors
that required consideration: first, the court must look to the common usage
or meaning of the specific language used in order to determine whether the
statement has a precise meaning or whether the statement is ambiguous; sec-
ond, the court must consider whether the statement is verifiable, i.e., can the
statement be proved or disproved or objectively characterized as true or
false; third, the court must look to the immediate context in which the state-
ment appeared; finally, the court must consider the broader context in which
the specific statement appeared. 242 Applying this test in Kerr, the court
noted that the term cheating did not have any unique definition; that an
allegation of cheating in the context of a trial of a criminal case could not be
objectively established as true or false; that the article that contained the
statement set forth the facts on which the author based his allegation of
cheating and referred to the article itself as an opinion; and that the article
appeared as a Sunday commentary in the editorial section. 243 Based on
these facts the court drew the legal conclusion that the publication was a
protected expression of opinion, and thus, not actionable. 244
Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely priv-
ileged and cannot form the basis of a defamation action even if the state-
ments are false and published with actual malice.245 The court in Gulf
Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Hurlbut 246 held that this absolute privilege
236. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
237. See Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 94, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945).
238. Rico, 696 S.W.2d at 449 (Reeves, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 449-50.
240. 706 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1570, 94 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1987).
241. Id. at 798-800.
242. Id. at 798.
243. Id. at 798-800.
244. Id. at 800-01.
245. See Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
246. 696 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ granted).
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also "applies to communications to law-enforcement officers and to agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers. ' 247 The court held that the statements that
defendants made to representatives of the attorney general's office, the Board
of Insurance Commissioners, and to a grand jury in Harris County were
absolutely privileged. 248
Three cases decided during the Survey period pointed out the extreme
difficulty a defendant faces in attempting to dispose of a defamation claim on
summary judgment. Consistent with its earlier opinion in Beaumont Enter-
prise & Journal v. Smith, 249 the Texas Supreme Court in Bessent v. Times-
Herald Printing Co. 250 reversed a summary judgment that the lower courts
had allowed based upon the affidavit of an officer of the defendant that indi-
cated that a United Press International (UPI) release was the basis of the
allegedly defamatory article. 251 The affidavit also claimed that the UPI is
generally a reliable and accurate source of news. Since knowledge of facts
under the control of the defendant's employees formed the basis of these
statements, the court held that the affidavit could not be readily controverted
and could not form the basis for a summary judgment.252 Similarly the
court in Associated Telephone Directory Publishers, Inc. v. Better Business
Bureau 253 reversed a summary judgment that had as its basis the affidavit of
the defendant rebutting any actual malice in the communication of the alleg-
edly defamatory information. 254 Finally, the court in Sellards v. Express-
News Corp.255 held that a summary judgment was not proper in the case of
an allegedly defamatory statement that was ambiguous; the jury must deter-
mine how the ordinary reader would interpret an ambiguous statement. 256
The San Antonio court of appeals considered the little known tort of inva-
sion of privacy in Donnel v. Lara.257 The plaintiffs in that case claimed that
the defendant had unlawfully intruded into their privacy by placing repeated
telephone calls to their residence at unreasonable hours. Relying upon the
Restatement of Torts, 258 the court noted that there are four separate and
distinct categories that comprise the tort of invasion of privacy. 259 These
include any unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, any ap-
propriation of another's name or likeness, any unreasonable publicity given
247. Id. at 99.
248. Id. at 100.
249. 687 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1985).
250. 709 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1986).
251. Id. at 636; see Beaumont Enter., 687 S.W.2d at 730.
252. 709 S.W.2d at 636.
253. 710 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Id. at 192-93.
255. 702 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. Id. at 679-80. The plaintiff in Sellards was a passenger injured in an automobile acci-
dent that killed the driver and that the defendant newspaper characterized as a "drug-induced
suicide." Id. at 678. The court believed that this statement was ambiguous in that the ordi-
nary reader could interpret it to mean that the injured plaintiff had in fact been involved with
drugs and suicide. Consequently, a fact issue existed as to whether the statement was defama-
tory. Id. at 679.
257. 703 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
259. 703 S.W.2d at 259.
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to another's private life, and any publicity that unreasonably places another
person in a false light before the public. 26° The court held that the facts of
Donnel clearly fell within the first category, and affirmed an award of nomi-
nal actual damages and exemplary damages in the amount of $4500.261
VIII. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
The cases decided during the Survey period did not create any new excep-
tions to the employment at will doctrine. This doctrine provides that, absent
an express agreement to the contrary, either the employer or the employee
may terminate their relationship at any time and for any reason. 262 The
courts in Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities,263 Vallone v. Agip Petroleum
Co.,264 and Totman v. Control Data Corp.265 relied upon the at will doctrine
to affirm summary judgments disposing of wrongful termination claims. 266
Two cases decided during the Survey period discussed statutorily created
exceptions to the at will doctrine. In Vasquez v. Bannworths, Inc. 267 the
Texas Supreme Court considered the appropriate relief to be granted in a
case involving the Texas right-to-work law.268 The jury in that case found
that the employer had terminated the plaintiff for belonging to a union. By
way of relief, the court awarded back pay and an injunction prohibiting the
employer from discriminating against the plaintiff in the event that she was
reemployed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the right to work law re-
quires that the remedy awarded by the court effectuate the policy of the
act.269 Under the circumstances of that case the court held that the act
mandated an injunction requiring the employer to rehire the plaintiff.270
The court in City of Brownsville v. Pena271 affirmed a jury verdict in favor of
a plaintiff who brought suit under the whistle blower statute.272
The court in Wilson v. Chemco Chemical Co. 273 considered the enforce-
ability of a covenant not to compete. The court upheld the covenant even
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
261. 703 S.W.2d at 259-61.
262. See Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc. v. Maurer, 675 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, no writ). But see Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (public
policy exception to the employment at will doctrine exists in a case in which an employer has
terminated an employee for refusing to do an illegal act that carried criminal penalties).
263. 715 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
264. 705 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
265. 707 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
266. See Berry, 715 S.W.2d at 62-63; Totman, 707 S.W.2d at 744; Vallone, 705 S.W.2d at
758-59.
267. 707 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1986).
268. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154g (Vernon 1971).
269. 707 S.W.2d at 888.
270. Id. at 888-89.
271. 716 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
272. Id. at 680-81. The whistle blower statute provides that "A state or local governmental
body may not suspend or terminate the employment of, or otherwise discriminate against, a
public employee who reports a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority if
the employee report is made in good faith." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 2
(Vernon Supp. 1987).
273. 711 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
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though it covered a geographic area including twenty-one counties in four
states.274 The court held that an evaluation of the reasonableness of the
geographic scope of the restraint must involve an analysis of the characteris-
tics of the area affected. Since the region involved was sparsely populated,
the twenty-one county area was reasonable. 27 5 The court in Williams v.
Compressor Engineering Corp.276 held that a former employer who obtains
an injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete may recover its attorney's
fees even though the trial court's injunction reduced the geographic scope of
the covenant. 277
274. Id. at 267-68.
275. Id.
276. 704 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
277. Id. at 474. The court so concluded despite that a finding that the covenant was over-
broad would prohibit the former employer from recovering actual damages for breach of the
covenant. Id.; see Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 314-15, 340 S.W.2d
950, 952-53 (1960).
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